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Frequency of Examinations and Student 
Achievement in a Randomized Experiment 
Maria De Paola, Vincenzo Scoppa
 
Department of Economics and Statistics, University of Calabria 
 
We carry out a randomized experiment involving undergraduate students enrolled at an Italian 
University attending an introductory economics class to evaluate the impact on achievement of 
examination frequency and interim feedback provision. Students in the treated group were allowed 
to undertake an intermediate exam and were informed about the results obtained, while students in 
the  control  group  could  only  take  the  final  exam.  It  emerges  that  students  undertaking  the 
intermediate exam perform better both in terms of probability of passing the exams and of grades 
obtained. High ability students appear to benefit more from the treatment. The experiment design 
allows us to disentangle “workload division or commitment” effects from “feedback provision” 
effects. We find that the estimated treatment impact is due exclusively to the first effect, while the 
feedback  provision  has  no  positive  effect  on  performance.  Finally,  the  better  performance  of 
treated students in targeted examinations seems not to be obtained at the expenses of results 
earned in other examinations.  
 
Keywords:  Education  Production  Function;  Student  Effort;  Work  Organization;  Feedback 
Provision, Higher Education; Randomized Evaluation. 
 




A  large  and  increasing  body  of  economic  literature  has  analyzed  educational  processes  from  a 
theoretical and an empirical point of view, trying to understand the role played by a number of factors, 
such as class-size, teacher abilities, peer group quality and parents’ background in the determination of 
students outcomes. 
Recently some works have tried to investigate the effects produced on student performance by 
teaching  and  evaluation  practices.  An  important  issue  concerning  this  topic  regards  the  optimal 
number of  examinations, that is, whether it is better to test students more or less frequently, assigning 
them a smaller or a larger workload. On the one hand, when examinations are frequent and focused on 
a small number of issues students may find it easier to organize their work, with a positive effect on 
their learning process. In addition, students used to procrastinate their effort may end up studying 
more if there are more frequent deadlines.  
Frequent examinations also offer students interim feedback of their results allowing them to 
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know if their study effort has been appropriate and to become aware of their areas of strength and 
weakness. In fact, students may need a tangible way to measure their progress during a class. 
On  the  other  hand,  when  testing is too recurrent, students may not have enough time to 
deepen their knowledge and to understand the relationships among the range of concepts covered in a 
given subject. Moreover, they may be exposed to an excessive amount of stress.  
The  effects  of  test  frequency  and  feedback  provision  on  student  achievement  have  been 
mainly  investigated from  a  pedagogical  and  psychological  point  of  view. Tuckman  (1997),  Deck 
(1998), Hattie and Timperley (2007), among others, show that more frequent testing produce positive 
effects on student performance. Ariely and Wertenbroch (2002) analyze the use of deadlines as a 
commitment device. According to their analysis, based on a sample of students enrolled at a MIT 
class,  people  have  self-control  problems  and  to  avoid  them  choose  costly  deadlines that  seem  to 
improve their academic performance. 
The  economic  literature  has  instead  scarcely  investigated  this  issue.  Most  of  the  existing 
literature examines feedback provision as an organizational design problem. In relative performance 
evaluations, for example, organizations decide whether to inform their employees about their relative 
standing at intermediate stages of the competition. In principle, information provision has ambiguous 
effects: performance might improve when workers who are obtaining a bad performance decide to 
work  harder  and  try  to  avoid  failure  and  when  workers  who  are  doing  well  become  even  more 
enthusiastic;  on  the  other  hand,  performance  tends  to  worsen  when  informed  underdog  become 
discouraged and workers getting a good performance, knowing that they are well ahead of the other 
colleagues, decide to shirk. These aspects have been analyzed from a theoretical point of view by a 
number of recent papers showing that feedback on past performance can affect current performance 
either directly – if past and current performances are substitutes or complements in the agent’s utility 
function – or indirectly, by revealing information on the marginal return to current effort (Lizzeri et 
al., 2002; Ederer, 2004;  Perry, 2006; Yildirim, 2005; Aoyagi, 2010).  
Empirical investigations trying to shed light on these effects are scant and lead to ambiguous 
results.  Erikkson  et  al.  (2008)  show,  through  a  laboratory  experiment,  that  feedback  on  relative 
performance, regardless of the pay scheme used, does not improve performance. Instead, Freeman and 
Gelber (2010) find that individual performance improves when tournament participants are informed 
about their own and their competitors’ past results. 
Some works have tried to investigate these issues focusing on educational contexts. Bandiera 
et  al.  (2008)  study  the  effect  of  providing  university  students  with  interim  feedback  information 
regarding their own performance. The authors show a positive and statistically significant effect of 
feedback  provision  on  student  final  performance.  In  a  similar  vein,  Azmat  and  Iriberri  (2010), 
considering high school students in Spain, investigate the effect of informing students on whether they 
were performing above or below the class average. It emerges that students receiving this type of 
information obtain better grades.   3 
In this paper we contribute to this emerging literature analyzing the effect of test frequency 
and feedback provision on a sample of Italian university students. Currently, in Italy University classes  
are typically organized in long modules offering about 60-80 hours of teaching activities. At the end of 
each class students take an exam and usually no intermediate assessment of student knowledge is 
undertaken. This organization is the result of the introduction of some new university rules, which 
have imposed a limit to the maximum number of exams needed to gain a First Level Degree. Before 
this change, teaching activity was organized in short modules (30-40 hours of teaching activity) and 
assessment was undertaken at the end of each module. The limit of a maximum number of exams 
introduced by the new law has forced Universities to reorganize their academic curricula and to unify 
short modules. The effects of this change have not been investigated yet. Nevertheless, if frequent 
examinations  encourage  students  to  study  more  and  allow  them  to  receive  useful  feedback  then 
perhaps it would be worthwhile to put additional effort in trying to identify the optimal number of 
exams and to improve teaching organization.  
To investigate the effects of test frequency and interim feedback on student  performance we 
have conducted a randomized field experiment involving 344 undergraduate students enrolled at a 
middle  sized  Italian  public  University  and  attending  an  introductory  economics  class.  Students 
participating at the experiment were randomly assigned to a control group and to a treatment group. 
Students  in  the  treatment  group  were  allowed  to  undertake  an  intermediate  examination,  while 
students in the control group were permitted to undertake exclusively the final examination at  the end 
of the course program (as established by the University rules).  
We  firstly  investigate  “intention-to-treat”  effects,  considering  as  treated  all  the  students 
assigned to the treatment group by the random procedure. It emerges that students in the treatment 
group perform significantly better than students in the control group in terms of probability of passing 
exams and of grades obtained. Subsequently, we investigate the impact of the effective participation to 
the treatment, using as an instrument the random assignment to the groups: adjusting the “intention-to-
treat”  effect  for  non-compliance  leads  to  a  stronger  and  highly  significant  effect  of  intermediate 
examination on student performance. 
As the treatment effect can be seen as the combined result of a “feedback provision” effect and 
a “workload division or commitment” effect, we propose a framework to disentangle them. We find 
that the estimated effect is due exclusively to the “workload division or commitment” effect, while the 
feedback provision has no positive impact on performance. 
Finally, we show that the improvement detected in the performance of treated students is not 
the  result  of  a  substitution  effect.  As  a  matter  of  fact,  treated  students  did  not  obtain  a  worse 
performance in non targeted examinations compared to students in the control group. 
The paper is organized as follows. In section 2 the design of the experiment is explained and 
some  information  on  the  Italian  University  system  are  provided.  Section  3  shows  the  effects  of 
examination frequency and feedback provision on the probability of passing exams and on grades   4 
obtained  by  students.  In  Section  4,  using  an  IV  strategy,  we  investigate  the  treatment  effects  on 
students who have effectively undertaken the intermediate examination. In Section 5 we disentangle 
feedback effects from workload division or commitment effects. Section 6 investigates the existence 
of substitution effects. Section 7 concludes. 
 
2. Experiment Description and Data 
The  experiment  we  conducted  has  involved  344  students  enrolled  at  the  Microeconomics  and 
Macroeconomics classes offered by the First Level Degree Course in Business and Administration 
(BA  hereafter)  at  the  University  of  Calabria  in  the  academic  year  2009-2010.  The  University  of 
Calabria is a middle-sized public university located in the South of Italy. It has currently about 34,000 
students enrolled in different Degree Courses and at different levels of the Italian University system.  
Since the 2001 reform, the Italian University system is organized around three main levels: 
First  Level  Degrees (3  years  of  legal  duration),  Second  Level  Degrees  (2  years  more)  and  Ph.D 
Degrees. In order to gain a First Level Degree students have to acquire a total of 180 credits. Students 
who have acquired a First Level Degree can undertake a Second Level Degree (acquiring 120 more 
credits). After having accomplished their Second Level Degree, students can enroll in a Ph.D. degree. 
The 2001 reform has introduced a credit system aimed to facilitate mutual recognition of degrees 
among  European  countries  and  has  given  autonomy  to  Universities.  Among  the  unintended 
consequences of the reform there has been a proliferation of short classes. For example, at the BA 
Degree offered by the University of Calabria, a typical class allowed to acquire 5 credits, and students 
had to undertake more than 30 exams in order to acquire 180 credits. The introductory classes in 
Mathematics,  Microeconomics,  Macroeconomics,  Statistics  etc.,  were  divided  in  two  modules  (5 
credits each) assessed through two different exams at the end of each teaching period. In order to limit 
the proliferation of classes, a new rule, known as “DM 270”, coming into effect in the academic year 
2008/09, has imposed a maximum of 20 exams for First Level Degrees leaving unchanged the number 
of credits to acquire (180). 
At the University of Calabria the “DM 270” has led to a reorganization of  the academic 
curriculum in order to reduce the number of exams students had to undertake. In particular, some 
classes, such as Macroeconomics and Microeconomics, initially split in two modules were unified in a 
single class (10 credits) and students were required to undertake a unique exam. 
  One of the ideas behind the “DM 270” was to give students more time to prepare for exams 
and avoid them the stress deriving from sitting for a large number of examinations. However, as 
explained above, reducing the number of exams might also produce some negative effects on student 
performance.  
By comparing the average performance of students enrolled at the BA Degree, immediately 
before and after the introduction of “DM 270”, it emerges a drop in the number of credits acquired by   5 
students. Students enrolled in 2007/2008, under the old regime, have acquired 38.9 credits during their 
first year, while their counterparts enrolled in 2008/2009, under the new system, have acquired only 
32.4 credits. However, these figures might be driven by temporal trends and unobserved changes in 
student and instructors’ characteristics. Then, in order to try to shed light on this issue, we have 
decided to undertake the experiment described in this paper.  
  At  the  beginning  of  the  Microeconomics  and  Macroeconomics  classes  (in  March  2010) 
students were informed of the experiment both through presentations during the teaching hours and 
through a letter, sent to all students, explaining the format of the experiment.  
We  asked  students  to  register  for  joining  the  experiment.  We  did  not  consider  in  the 
experiment the small fraction (around 10%) of students who did not register.
1 On the basis of the 
available administrative information on students’ characteristics, we proceeded to the stratification of 
students  participating  to  the  experiment  according  to  the  following  variables:  class  attended 
(Microeconomics or Macroeconomics); gender; type of High School attended (3 categories: Lyceum; 
Technical schools; Vocational and other types of schools); final grade obtained at High School (split 
in 4 categories corresponding to quartiles).  
Following this procedure the 344 students were allocated to 48 non null groups. Within each 
group,  one  half of students  was  randomly  assigned to  the treatment  group  – allowed to take  the 
intermediate exam – and the other half was assigned to the control group, which could take a unique 
exam at the end of the class, without an intermediate exam.
2 We ended up with 172 students assigned 
to the treatment group, and 172 to the control group. 
The random assignment procedure was carried out at the presence of students. They were also 
informed by e-mail of their assignment status and the list of students belonging to the treatment and 
control group was published on the classes’ web-pages. 
The  Microeconomics  and  Macroeconomics  classes  were  taught  to  students  enrolled, 
respectively, at the first and second year of the BA Degree. Both these classes started in March 2010 
and lasted until June. Each class program consisted in 60 hours of teaching activity and 20 hours of 
laboratory. Treatment and control groups attended the class in the same room, at the same time and 
with the same instructor and teaching material. 
After the first 30 hours of teaching activity (and 10 hours of laboratory) there was a break of 
two weeks (May 2010). The classes teaching programs were then naturally divided in two parts (that 
is, Microeconomics-1 and Microeconomics-2 and Macroeconomics-1 and Macroeconomics-2). During 
the break period, students in the treatment group were allowed to undertake an intermediate exam 
covering respectively the Microeconomics-1 and the Macroeconomics-1 program. The intermediate 
exam consisted in 30 multiple choice questions and lasted one hour. 77% of students in the treatment 
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group have effectively undertaken the test.  
Teaching activities re-started in the mid of May and lasted for other 30 hours (+10 hours of 
laboratory), until the end of June. In July students in the treatment group were required to complete 
their examination by taking an exam covering exclusively the second part of the teaching program 
(respectively, Microeconomics-2 and Macroeconomics-2), consisting in 30 multiple choice questions 
(in one hour). The final grade obtained by these students was given by the average of the grades 
earned at the first and at the second part of the exam. 
Students in the control group have, instead, undertaken the exam covering the whole course 
program (the first plus the second part). This exam was held in July and has consisted in 30+30 
multiple choice questions. These students had the double of time allowed to students in the treatment 
groups to complete the entire examination (two hours broken by an interval of 30 minutes).  
As regards the first module, since each exam question was randomly selected from a large 
test-bank, the exam for treated students can be considered equivalent to the exam for students in the 
control group. The second module was identical for treated and control students. 
We had a number of non-complier students: 22 treated students never shown (neither to the 
intermediate nor to the whole examination); 43 treated students shifted to the control group (17 did not 
undertake  the  intermediate  exam,  while  26  chose  to  undertake  the  entire  exam  after  having 
participated at the intermediate exam).
3 Finally, 27 students took the intermediate exam, but did not 
complete the exam undertaking the second part. 
In this first part of our analysis we focus on “intention-to-treat” effects, considering as treated 
all the 172 students randomly selected. In sections 4 and 5 we proceed both by using an instrumental 
variable strategy and by defining a more restricted sample of students.  
We  measure  student  performance  considering  both  the  probability  of  passing  the  target 
examinations and the grades obtained. In the Italian system, passing grades range from 18 to “30 cum 
laude”, which we consider equal to 31. We observe both grades in passed examinations (18-31) and in 
failed examinations. Only exams undertaken until the 31
st of July 2010 were taken into account in 
determining student performance.  
Table 1 provides descriptive statistics for our sample of students. About 61% of students were 
female. 44% of students attended the Macroeconomics class while 56% attended Microeconomics. 
High School Grade ranged from 60 (the minimum passing grade) to 100 (the maximum grade), with a 
mean of 88.8. Students mainly came from Technical Schools (45%) and Lyceums (about 42%). As an 
additional measure of student ability we have considered the number of credits acquired by students 
until the beginning of the experiment, Credits, and to make comparable the two cohorts of students 
involved in the experiment we have divided the number of credits by the number of exam sessions 
they had available (1 for first year students and 3 for second year students). The average number of 
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credits  acquired  in  a  semester  was  14.24.  About  55%  of  students  came  from  the  same  province 
(NUTS-3)  where  the  University  is  located.  14%  of  sample  students  did  not  enroll  at  University 
immediately after High School graduation, but a year or more later (Late Enrollment). 
At the end of exam session, 35% of students passed the exams considered in this experiment. 
The average grade (ranging from 1 to 31 is 15.4). The average grade for students passing the exams 
was 22.6. 
Table 1. Descriptive Statistics  
Variables  Obs  Mean  Std. Dev.  Min  Max 
           
Pass  344  0.348  0.477  0  1 
Grade  236  15.371  8.571  1  31 
Treatment (Intermediate Exam)  344  0.500  0.501  0  1 
Macroeconomics  344  0.439  0.497  0  1 
Female  344  0.613  0.488  0  1 
Credits  344  14.245  6.865  0  28.667 
High School Grade  344  88.828  8.479  68  100 
Technical Schools  344  0.453  0.499  0  1 
Lyceum  344  0.416  0.494  0  1 
Late Enrollment   344  0.140  0.347  0  1 
Resident near University  344  0.558  0.497  0  1 
Notes: Grades in each class ranges from 18 to “30 cum laude” (set equal to 31). High School Grade ranges from 
60 to 100. 
In the first two columns of Table 2 are reported, by treatment groups, means for a number of 
individual characteristics. In the third column we report differences in means between treatment and 
control groups (standard errors are reported in parentheses). Results show that the randomization has 
been  successful  in  creating  comparable  treatment  and  control  groups  along  the  observable 
characteristics: there are no significant differences by treatment status in  class, gender, number of 
credits acquired, High School Grade, type of High School attended, Late Enrollment and place of 
residence. 
Table 2.  Student characteristics across treatment and control groups 
  Means    Differences (s.e.) 
  Treatment  Control    Treatment v. Control 
Macroeconomics  0.442  0.436    0.006 
        (0.054) 
Female  0.610  0.616    -0.006 
        (0.053) 
Credits  14.031  14.459    -0.428 
        (0.741) 
High School Grade  88.564  89.093    -0.529 
        (0.915) 
Technical Schools  0.453  0.453    0.000 
        (0.054) 
Lyceum  0.419  0.413    0.006 
        (0.053) 
Late Enrollment   0.157  0.122    0.035 
        (0.037) 
Resident near University  0.552  0.564    -0.012 
        (0.054) 
Notes: Standard errors are reported in parentheses.   8 
3. Treatment Effects on Student Achievement 
In  this  Section  we  analyze  the  effects  of  treatment  both  on  the  student  probability  of  passing 
examinations and on grades obtained. We focus on “intention-to-treat” effects considering as treated 
all students randomly assigned to the treated group. 
3.1. The Effect of Treatment on the Probability of Passing the Exam 
We  use  a  probit  model  to  estimate  the  probability  of  passing  the  examination  targeted  in  the 
experiment (either Microeconomics or Macroeconomics):  
 
[1]            i i i i i i i X Treatment X Treatment Pass            1 0 , , | 1 Pr  
 
Our dependent variable  i Pass  takes the value of one if student i passed the exam, and 0 otherwise, 
i Treatment  is a dummy variable which takes value of 1 if student i was assigned to the treatment 
group  while  takes  value  of  0  if  i  belong  to  the  control  group,  i X   is  a  vector  of  the  individual 
characteristics of i (measures of his/her ability and personal characteristics),  i   is a dummy for the 
Macroeconomics  class,  i    is  an  error  term  capturing  idiosyncratic  shocks  or  unobserved  student 
characteristics. 
  For each student we observe separately the outcome  of the two modules composing each 
exam. However, in this section we have organized data at student level taking as a measure of student 
performance the average outcome at the two modules. This implies that we consider the exam as 
passed when the average grade obtained by the student is equal or higher than 18. 
The coefficient on Treatment captures the “intention-to treat” effects on student performance 
(with respect to the control group). Estimates are reported in Table 3. In all the specifications, standard 
errors are robust to heteroskedasticity.  
In column 1 we regress  i Pass  on the Treatment and Macroeconomics dummies, without other 
controls. It emerges that students in the treatment group have a probability of about 15 percentage 
points higher to pass the exam. The coefficient is significant at the 1 percent level. In column 2 we 
control for individual characteristics: the probability of passing the exam increases by 20 percentage 
points for students in the treatment group.  
In columns 3 and 4 we run separate regressions for the Macroeconomics and Microeconomics 
classes. The effect appears relevant for both classes. In columns 5 and 6, showing separately results 
for males and females, it seems that males react more than females to the treatment, but when we use 
an interaction term to test the statistical significance of this difference we are not able to reject the null 
hypothesis (results not reported).  
As robustness checks we have also used a linear probability model. OLS estimates are very   9 
similar to the probit estimates presented in Table 3 and are not reported.  
 
Table 3. Estimates of the treatment effect on the probability of passing the exam. Dependent 
variable: Pass 
  (1)  (2)  (3)  (4)  (5)  (6) 
  All  All  Macro  Micro  Females  Males 
Treatment (Intermediate 
Exam) 
0.153***  0.205***  0.290***  0.136*  0.161**  0.262*** 
  (0.051)  (0.054)  (0.077)  (0.074)  (0.072)  (0.083) 
Macroeconomics  -0.071  -0.187***      -0.198**  -0.176** 
  (0.051)  (0.057)      (0.077)  (0.085) 
Female    -0.042  -0.041  -0.041     
    (0.057)  (0.086)  (0.078)     
High School Grade    0.013***  0.011**  0.015***  0.012***  0.012** 
    (0.004)  (0.005)  (0.005)  (0.004)  (0.006) 
Credits    0.033***  0.028***  0.036***  0.040***  0.028*** 
    (0.005)  (0.009)  (0.006)  (0.007)  (0.008) 
Technical Schools    0.005  0.029  -0.002  0.210*  -0.241* 
    (0.091)  (0.130)  (0.130)  (0.127)  (0.131) 
Lyceum    0.112  0.162  0.089  0.270**  -0.127 
    (0.093)  (0.132)  (0.133)  (0.133)  (0.129) 
Late Enrollment    0.021  0.089  -0.013  0.018  0.056 
    (0.088)  (0.164)  (0.103)  (0.131)  (0.131) 
Resident near University    0.058  0.053  0.068  -0.057  0.231*** 
    (0.056)  (0.081)  (0.075)  (0.070)  (0.089) 
Observations  344  344  151  193  211  133 
Pseudo R-squared  0.024  0.244  0.256  0.247  0.347  0.168 
Log-likelihood  -217.180  -168.159  -69.703  -96.345  -88.383  -72.322 
Notes: The Table reports marginal effects from probit estimates evaluated at the mean values of the explanatory 
variables in the sample. Robust standard errors are reported in parentheses. The symbols ***, **, * indicate that 
coefficients are statistically significant, respectively, at the 1, 5, and 10 percent level. 
 
The effects of control variables are consistent with the findings emerging from the education 
literature.  Both  our  measures  of  student  predetermined  ability,  High  School  Grade  and  Credits, 
produce a positive and statistically significant effect on academic performance. Once we control for 
these measures of abilities neither the dummy Lyceum nor the dummy Technical Schools produce a 
significant effect. The dummy Female is not statistically significant. The probability of passing the 
Macroeconomics examination turns out to be lower than the probability of passing Microeconomics. 
   
 
3.2. The Effect of Treatment on Grades 
In this section we estimate the effect of the treatment on student grades. Our dependent variable is the 
grade obtained by student i at the exam. To take into account the fact that Grade is censored, since a 
number of students did not sit for the exam and we do not have information on their performance, we 
use a Tobit model expressing the observed outcome  i Grade in terms of a latent variable 
*
i Grade : 
 
[2]          i i i i i X Treatment Grade           1 0
*    10 
         
* , 0 max i i Grade Grade   
We set equal to zero the variable Grade for absent students.  
Table 4 reports Tobit estimates using the same specifications as in Table 3 (the lower limit has 
been set equal to 0 since the minimum grade observed is 1). In Panel A are reported the marginal 
effects of explanatory variables on the expected grade conditional on being uncensored, that is, given 
that the student has sit for the exam. In all the specifications it emerges that taking an intermediate 
exam has a positive and statistically significant impact on student achievement: the expected grade 
increases by about 5 points when controlling for individual characteristics. 
On  the  basis  of  the  Tobit  estimations,  we  have  also  determined  the  marginal  effect  of 
treatment on the probability that a student will undertake the exam (that is, the effect on the probability 
that the grade is greater than 0). These effects are reported in Panel B of Table 4. Undertaking the 
intermediate examination increases the probability of sitting for the exam by 25 percentage points. 
Treatment effects do not differ much according to the type of class attended (columns 3 and 4) 
by the students and according to gender (columns 5 and 6).
 4 
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censoring. Results (not reported) are very similar.   11 
 
Table 4. Tobit estimates of the Treatment Effect on Grades 
 
Panel A. Marginal Effects: Conditional on Being Uncensored 
 
  (1)  (2)  (3)  (4)  (5)  (6) 
  All  All  Macro  Micro  Females  Males 
Treatment (Intermediate 
Exam) 
4.489***  4.993***  5.124***  4.839***  4.890***  4.901*** 
  (0.782)  (0.702)  (1.023)  (0.966)  (0.856)  (1.211) 
Macroeconomics  -1.057  -2.577***      -2.920***  -1.875 
  (0.777)  (0.712)      (0.874)  (1.229) 
Female    -0.215  -0.593  0.259     
    (0.709)  (1.075)  (0.957)     
High School Grade    0.088*  0.019  0.145**  0.045  0.165** 
    (0.045)  (0.071)  (0.061)  (0.055)  (0.081) 
Credits    0.528***  0.510***  0.542***  0.593***  0.466*** 
    (0.057)  (0.091)  (0.074)  (0.068)  (0.109) 
Technical Schools    -0.808  -0.344  -1.247  0.439  -3.083 
    (1.115)  (1.563)  (1.585)  (1.396)  (1.913) 
Lyceum    1.075  1.565  0.697  1.835  -0.516 
    (1.114)  (1.558)  (1.585)  (1.403)  (1.884) 
Late Enrollment    0.863  0.711  0.833  1.046  0.742 
    (0.987)  (1.536)  (1.315)  (1.247)  (1.616) 
Resident near University    0.144  -0.008  0.195  -0.948  1.859 
    (0.708)  (1.041)  (0.975)  (0.865)  (1.285) 
             
 
Panel B. Marginal Effects: Probability Uncensored 
 
Treatment  (Intermediate 
Exam) 
0.224***  0.257***  0.296***  0.226***  0.253***  0.250*** 
  (0.040)  (0.037)  (0.061)  (0.046)  (0.045)  (0.063) 
Macroeconomics  -0.054  -0.139***      -0.157***  -0.100 
  (0.039)  (0.037)      (0.046)  (0.064) 
Female    -0.011  -0.034  0.012     
    (0.037)  (0.064)  (0.045)     
High School Grade    0.005*  0.001  0.007**  0.002  0.009** 
    (0.002)  (0.004)  (0.003)  (0.003)  (0.004) 
Credits    0.028***  0.030***  0.026***  0.031***  0.024*** 
    (0.003)  (0.005)  (0.004)  (0.004)  (0.006) 
Technical Schools    -0.043  -0.020  -0.060  0.023  -0.159 
    (0.058)  (0.092)  (0.075)  (0.074)  (0.099) 
Lyceum    0.055  0.089  0.033  0.094  -0.027 
    (0.058)  (0.092)  (0.075)  (0.074)  (0.097) 
Late Enrollment    0.042  0.040  0.037  0.051  0.037 
    (0.052)  (0.091)  (0.062)  (0.066)  (0.084) 
Resident near University    0.008  -0.000  0.009  -0.050  0.099 
    (0.037)  (0.062)  (0.046)  (0.046)  (0.066) 
             
Observations  344  344  151  193  211  133 
Pseudo R-squared  0.017  0.069  0.068  0.072  0.091  0.048 
Log-likelihood  -1015  -960.8  -410.8  -548.5  -578.8  -376.7 
Notes:  The  Table  reports  marginal  effects  from  Tobit  estimates.  Robust  standard  errors  are  reported  in 
parentheses. The symbols ***, **, * indicate that coefficients are statistically significant, respectively, at the 1, 
5, and 10 percent level. 
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3.3. Heterogeneous Effects Across Students with Different Abilities 
In this section we investigate whether the effect of treatment differs according to students’ abilities. To 
divide students into a high ability and a low ability group, we have used three different measures of 
their skills: 1) the grades obtained at high school (High School Grade); 2) the number of credits gained 
by the beginning of the experiment (Credits); 3) their predicted performance (CompositeAbility).  
To obtain the latter composite measure of student ability, we follow Angrist and Lavy (2009) 
and we first estimate a model for student performance considering exclusively students in the control 
group, using as explanatory variables individual characteristics such as gender, type of high school 
attended, high school grade. The estimated coefficients of this model are then used for predicting the 
performance of students in treated and control groups, on the basis of their effective characteristics.  
In Table 5 are reported a number of probit estimates showing the effects of treatment on the 
probability  of  passing  exams  respectively  on  high  and  the  low  ability  students.  In  column  1  we 
measure student ability considering Credits and to investigate whether there are heterogeneous effects 
we use the interaction variable Credits*Treatment, where Credits is demeaned. The coefficient on the 
interaction term is positive and statistically significant at the 10 percent level, suggesting that the 
positive impact of more frequent exams increases with student ability.  
 
Table 5. Probit Estimates. Heterogeneous effects according to student abilities 
  (1)  (2)  (3)  (4)  (5)  (6)  (7) 
  All  High ab.  Low ab.  High ab.  Low ab.  High ab.  Low ab. 
Treatment (Intermediate 
Exam) 
0.184***  0.343***  0.050  0.360***  0.058  0.215***  0.124** 
  (0.057)  (0.083)  (0.053)  (0.078)  (0.055)  (0.081)  (0.053) 
Treatment*Credits(demeaned)  0.021*             
  (0.011)             
Macroeconomics  -0.196***  -0.168**  -0.147***  -0.314***  -0.085  -0.177*  -0.067 
  (0.057)  (0.084)  (0.050)  (0.087)  (0.056)  (0.099)  (0.071) 
Female  -0.054  0.079  -0.142**  0.048  -0.087  0.034  -0.108** 
  (0.058)  (0.092)  (0.058)  (0.094)  (0.060)  (0.086)  (0.052) 
High School Grade  0.013***  0.019***  0.005  0.011  0.003  0.015**  0.004 
  (0.004)  (0.006)  (0.004)  (0.012)  (0.006)  (0.006)  (0.003) 
Credits  0.023***  0.043***  0.012  0.042***  0.024***  0.038***  0.010 
  (0.007)  (0.013)  (0.008)  (0.009)  (0.005)  (0.009)  (0.006) 
Technical Schools  0.024  -0.007  0.058  -0.204  0.191  0.036  0.029 
  (0.093)  (0.147)  (0.092)  (0.134)  (0.142)  (0.157)  (0.068) 
Lyceum  0.131  0.164  0.030  -0.139  0.274**  0.190  -0.048 
  (0.096)  (0.151)  (0.093)  (0.136)  (0.122)  (0.160)  (0.066) 
Late Enrollment  0.004  -0.029  0.010  -0.257**  0.197*  -0.080  0.071 
  (0.085)  (0.131)  (0.085)  (0.110)  (0.107)  (0.123)  (0.094) 
Resident near University  0.050  0.016  0.035  0.037  0.081  0.046  0.025 
  (0.056)  (0.095)  (0.053)  (0.092)  (0.056)  (0.087)  (0.056) 
Observations  344  166  178  169  175  172  172 
Pseudo R-squared  0.255  0.226  0.154  0.267  0.223  0.148  0.172 
Log-likelihood  -165.710  -88.771  -70.899  -85.701  -72.155  -101.055  -61.918 
Notes: The Table reports marginal effects. Robust standard errors are reported in parentheses. The symbols ***, 
**, * indicate that coefficients are statistically significant, respectively, at the 1, 5, and 10 percent level. 
 
To better describe this aspect we run separate regressions for students with ability above and   13 
below the median according to the three measures of ability we have available. In columns 2 and 3 
students are grouped according to the number of Credits, in columns 4 and 5 using the High School 
Grade and in columns 6 and 7 we define the High and Low ability groups on the basis of their 
predicted performance, CompositeAbility. Changing the measure of student ability does not change the 
results: the effect of treatment on high ability students is always stronger, while the effect for low 
ability students is not significantly different from zero. 
The same findings emerge also when we use as dependent variable the grades obtained at 
exams (estimates are not reported and available upon request). 
 
4.  Treatment  effects  on  students  effectively  undertaking  the 
intermediate exam: IV estimates 
In the previous section we have analyzed “intention-to-treat” effects, since we have considered all 
students in the treatment group independently on their effective participation at the intermediate exam. 
Therefore, the estimated effects are diluted by the fact that some treated students may actually not 
have undertaken the intermediate exam (see Angrist and Pischke, 2009; Bloom, 1984). 
  As a matter of fact, students in the treatment group may refuse treatment choosing to not sit 
for the intermediate exam or choosing after the intermediate exam to retake the entire exam. On the 
other hand, the 172 students assigned to the control group could not shift to the treatment group. 
In this section we analyze the impact of the effective treatment defining two alternative treated 
groups. Firstly, we consider as treated the 133 students (out of 172) assigned to the treatment group 
who have effectively undertaken the intermediate exam regardless of whether they have subsequently 
shifted to the entire exam (“Effective Treatment 1”). Secondly, we define a more restricted treated 
group  excluding  from  the  133  students  undertaking  the  intermediate  exam  26  students  who  have 
decided to take in July the entire exam (“Effective Treatment 2”). 
In both cases, to deal with the endogeneity problems related to the effective treatment, we 
adopt  an  instrumental  variable  strategy  using  as  an  instrument  for  the  effective  participation  the 
randomly assigned treatment status (Treatment). 
In Table 6 are reported Instrumental Variable estimates. In columns 1 and 2 we consider as 
dependent variable Pass, reporting the marginal effects of an IV-probit model. In column 1 we focus 
on “Effective Treatment 1” while in column 2 we deal with “Effective Treatment 2”. In columns 3 and 
4 the dependent variable is Grade. We report IV-tobit estimates (the marginal effects conditional on 
being uncensored) considering respectively “Effective Treatment 1” and “Effective Treatment 2”. 
In Panel (B) are reported first stage results where we show that the assigned treatment status is 
highly significant in predicting the effective treatment.  
Results show that adjusting “intention-to-treat” effects for non-participation leads to a stronger 
impact of the treatment on student performance measured both as the probability of passing the exam   14 
and  by  the  grade  obtained.  The  increase  in  the  effect  is  proportional  to  the  reciprocal  of  the 
participation rate.  
 
Table 6. IV estimates of the effects of effective participation to the treatment 
  (1)  (2)  (3)  (8) 








Effective Treatment 1  0.264***    6.446***   
  (0.079)    (0.991)   
Effective Treatment 2    0.341***    8.703*** 
    (0.098)    (1.364) 
Macroeconomics  -0.181***  -0.172***  -2.334***  -2.181*** 
  (0.058)  (0.059)  (0.687)  (0.705) 
Female  -0.053  -0.066  -0.602  -0.613 
  (0.059)  (0.060)  (0.702)  (0.714) 
High School Grade  0.013***  0.012***  0.088**  0.070* 
  (0.004)  (0.004)  (0.043)  (0.043) 
Credits  0.035***  0.034***  0.554***  0.529*** 
  (0.005)  (0.005)  (0.056)  (0.056) 
Technical Schools  -0.017  -0.031  -0.944  -1.346 
  (0.091)  (0.090)  (1.042)  (1.054) 
Lyceum  0.106  0.095  1.121  0.819 
  (0.092)  (0.092)  (1.049)  (1.068) 
Late Enrollment  0.023  0.033  0.818  1.249 
  (0.088)  (0.088)  (1.014)  (1.060) 
Resident near University  0.047  0.048  -0.070  -0.153 
  (0.056)  (0.056)  (0.694)  (0.703) 
         
Observations  344  344  344  344 
 
Panel B: First Stage 
Treatment (Randomly Assigned)  0.773  0.626  0.773  0.626 
  (0.0317)  (0.036)  (0.0317)  (0.036) 








Note. In the First Stage the dummy for the assigned treatment is used as an instrument for “Effective Treatment 1” and 
“Effective Treatment 2”. Standard errors (reported in parentheses) are corrected for heteroskedasticity. The symbols ***, 
**, * indicate that coefficients are statistically significant, respectively, at the 1, 5, and 10 percent level.  
 
 
5. Disentangling Feedback and Workload Division Effects 
The  positive  impact  of  treatment  on  student  performance  emerging  in  previous  estimates  can  be 
interpreted as the joint result of a feedback provision effect and the effects deriving from the workload  
division and commitment obtained defining more frequent deadlines. 
In this section we propose a framework to try to disentangle the feedback provision effect 
from the other two effects. At this aim, instead of considering student performance on the whole 
examination, we have organized our data at student-module level to have information on the results 
obtained by students separately for the two modules of each examination (Microeconomics-1 and 
Microeconomics-2; Macroeconomics-1 and Macroeconomics-2).  
We exploit the fact that treated students undertaking module 1 compared to control students 
undertaking the same module benefit exclusively from a workload division or commitment effect,   15 
while no feedback effect is at work. Then, comparing the performance of treated and control students 
at this module we are able to disentangle the workload/commitment effect. Instead, to isolate the 
feedback  effect,  we  compare  the  difference  in  performance  of  treated  students  between  the  two 
modules. Treated students in both modules benefit of workload/commitment effects, but only for the 
second module they can obtain positive effects from feedback. Then, the difference in the performance 
obtained by these students at the two modules should reflect feedback provision, given that we are 
able to neutralize any eventual heterogeneity in the difficulty level of the first and second module by  
subtracting  the  difference  in  performance  at  the  two  modules  obtained  by  control  students. 
Unfortunately, we are not able to distinguish the workload division effect from the commitment effect 
deriving from frequent deadlines since they overlap in each module. 
Formally, we assume that student performance is determined as follows: 
 [3]        ij i D i W ij F ij X D W F Y             2 0  
where  ij Y  is the performance of student i at module j, with j=1,2. The performance is affected by 
feedback provision,  ij F , which is a dummy equal to 1 for students receiving feedback (that is, treated 
students undertaking the second module), workload division or commitment,  i W , which is a dummy 
taking value of one for students undertaking the exam in two separated modules (treated students), a 
dummy for the second module,  2 D , measuring the relative difficulty of this module, and a vector  i X  
of  individual  characteristics  and  a  dummy  for  Macroeconomics.  We  expect    that  the 
workload/commitment has a positive effect on student performance,  0  W  , while according to the 
literature the feedback effect  F   could be either positive or negative. 
In the Table below using eq. [3] we report the expected performance of treated and control 
students respectively at module 1 and 2.  
 
Table 7. Student’s expected performance by treatment status and module 
Treated, I module:     i W T X Y E       0 1   since  0  ij F ,  1  i W ;  0 2  D  
Treated, II module:     i D W F T X Y E           0 2   since  1  ij F , 1  i W ;  1 2  D  
Control, I module:     i C X Y E     0 1   since  0  ij F ,  0  i W ;  0 2  D  
Control, II module:    i D C X Y E       0 2   since  0  ij F ,  0  i W ;  1 2  D  
 
For  example,  the  expected  performance  for  treated  students  at  module  2  is  equal  to 
  i D W F T X Y E           0 2  as these students have received feedback, have a reduced workload 
and are undertaking the second module. 
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To disentangle the feedback and the workload/commitment effect we consider the following 
equations:  
 
            F C C T T Y E Y E Y E Y E      1 2 1 2        which gives the “feedback effect” 
    W C T Y E Y E    1 1               which gives the “workload division/commitment  effect” 
 
where we exploit the fact that the characteristics    i X  of treated and control students are on average 
the same thanks to the random assignment to the two groups. 
We base our analysis on a sub-sample of 166 students, excluding from the sample: students 
who did not sit for the examinations (108 students: 22 treated and 86 control); non complier students, 
that is, treated students who have shifted to the whole examination (43); students who have taken the 
intermediate examination but have not taken the second part (27). We exclude these students since for 
them it is not possible to clearly disentangle the feedback and the workload effects following the 
framework presented above. 
We  investigate  the  effects  produced  by  feedback  and  workload/commitment  both  on  the 
grades obtained by students and on their probability of passing the examinations. Since we are using 
two observations for each student, standard errors have been clustered at student level. 
For the sample of students considered in this analysis we do not have censored observations 
and, as a consequence, we use an OLS model to analyze the effects of interest on Grade. Estimates are 
reported in columns (1) and (2) of Table 8: in the first we do not control for individuals characteristics, 
which are instead included in the second specification. It emerges that the “workload/commitment” 
effects are positive and highly statistically significant. Students in the treated group obtain a grade 
higher of about 4 points (about 0.5 standard deviations of Grade). This effect can be interpreted both 
in  relation  to  the  splitting  of  class  workload  in  two  parts  –  which  may  help  students  at  better 
organizing their studying activities – and in relation to the “no procrastination commitment” obtained 
thanks to the fact that students in the treatment group face more frequent deadlines that may induce 
them to not procrastinate effort. 
On the other hand, the estimates show that the feedback effect is far from being statistically 
significant. 
Similar results are obtained also when we consider as dependent variable the dummy Pass 
using a probit model. As shown in columns (3) and (4), respectively with and without individual 
controls,  workload/commitment  increases  the  probability  of  passing  the  exam  of  23.1  percentage 
points (significant at the 1 percent level) while the feedback effect is null.  
The control variables show signs and coefficients similar to those discussed in the previous 
sections.  
The feedback and workload division effects estimated in this section can be related to the 
whole treatment effect estimated in the previous sections using as a measure of student performance   17 
the  average  grade  of  module  1  and  2  (   2 2 1 i i i Y Y Y   ).  In  fact,  using  equation  [3]  it  is 
straightforward to show that the whole treatment effect is equal to: 
           
2 2 2
0 0 0 0 F
W
D D W F L
C T Y E Y E






    
   
Estimating by OLS the whole treatment effect (1 observation for each student) on the sub-
sample of students considered to disentangle the two effects of interest, we obtain a coefficient of 4.14 
(t-stat= 4.43), which corresponds to the coefficient on workload division (4.367) plus the coefficient 
(divided by 2) on feedback (-0.452/2). 
 
Table 8. Feedback and Workload Division Effects 
  (1)  (2)  (3)  (4) 








Feedback  -0.452  -0.452  -0.003  0.006 
  (0.900)  (0.910)  (0.074)  (0.085) 
Workload Division  4.058***  4.367***  0.196***  0.231*** 
  (1.152)  (0.957)  (0.074)  (0.078) 
Macroeconomics  0.638  -1.928*  0.058  -0.069 
  (1.118)  (1.124)  (0.069)  (0.086) 
Module 2  -1.523**  -1.523**  -0.011  -0.016 
  (0.647)  (0.654)  (0.054)  (0.061) 
Female    -1.417    -0.110 
    (0.990)    (0.069) 
High School Grade    0.195***    0.011** 
    (0.060)    (0.004) 
Credits    0.560***    0.027*** 
    (0.095)    (0.007) 
Technical Schools    1.205    0.011 
    (1.708)    (0.115) 
Lyceum    2.690*    0.062 
    (1.606)    (0.111) 
Late Enrollment    -0.229    -0.012 
    (1.525)    (0.104) 
Resident near University    -0.461    0.011 
    (1.066)    (0.073) 
Constant  16.588***  -9.981*     
  (1.023)  (5.551)     
Observations  332  332  332  332 
R-squared  0.065  0.364     
Pseudo R-squared      0.031  0.169 
Log-likelihood      -215.447  -184.648 
Notes: Observations at module-student level: 2 observations for each student. In columns 3 and 4 we report 
marginal effects. Robust standard errors, clustered at student level, are reported in parentheses. The symbols 
***, **, * indicate that coefficients are statistically significant, respectively, at the 1, 5, and 10 percent level. 
 
 
6. Are students substituting effort? 
In  this  Section  we  investigate  if  treated  students  –  thanks  to  the  opportunity  to  undertake  the 
intermediate examination – have provided more effort and achieved a better performance or whether 
they have focused on the targeted examinations devoting less effort in studying activities related to   18 
other examinations. 
In  order  to  evaluate  this  aspect  we  analyze  student  performance  on  all  the  examinations 
students have to pass in the academic year considered. We stack data with the aim to use student-class 
level observations and deal separately with students of the first year (those attending Microeconomics) 
and students of the second year (students attending Macroeconomics). 
In  the  first  year  students  have  to  pass  8  examinations:
5  we  have  for  these  students  1544 
observations (193 students * 8 classes); in their second year students have to pass 8 examinations:
6 we 
end up with 1208 observations (151 students * 8 classes). Our dependent variable, Pass, is a dummy 
equal to 1 when the student passed a given exam, and 0 otherwise.  
We use a Linear Probability Model to estimate the following equation: 
 
[4] 
      i i i i i i i i i i E Treatment E Treatment E E X Treatment Pass                   7 7 1 1 7 7 1 1 1 0 * .. * ..
 
where the probability of passing each examination is related to individual characteristics X, a dummy 
j E   (j=1..7)  for  each  examination  (leaving  as  omitted  category  the  eighth  examination  – 
Microeconomics or Macroeconomics according to the cohort of students considered) to control for 
unobserved  factors  such  as  the  difficulty  of  the  subject  or  the  instructor’s  grading  standard.  The 
dummy Treatment allows us to identify the effect of treatment on the target examination ( 1  ) while 
the  interaction  terms    j E Treatment*   inform  us  on  whether  treated  students  have  a  worse 
performance compared to control students in non targeted examinations. In fact, the performance of 
treated students in examination j is given by  j    1 . 
Estimates are reported in Table 9. In column 1 we report results considering first year students 
attending  the  Microeconomics  class,  while  in  column  2  are  presented  estimates  for  second  year 
students attending the Macroeconomic class. The coefficients on Treatment are, as expected, in line 
with those shown in Table 3 (columns 3 and 4). On the other hand, we do not observe any significant 
difference  among  students  in  treated  and  control  groups  in  the  performance  on  non-target 
examinations. As shown at the foot of the Table, where are reported   j    1  and the respective 
standard errors, the coefficients are never statistically significant.  
Therefore, it seems that the improvement in student performance at the targeted examination is 
to be related to a higher student effort and is not driven by substitution effects.  
 
                                                       
5 Business  Administration 1, Public Law, French 1,  Computer Sciences, English 1, Mathematics, Statistics, 
Microeconomics. 
6 Trade Law,  Business Administration 2, Private Law, French 2, English 2, Financial Mathematics, Accounting, 
Macroeconomics.   19 
Table  9.  The  probability  of  Passing  Targeted  and  Non-Targeted  Exams.  Linear  Probability 
Model 
  (1)  (2) 
  First Year  Second Year 
Treatment  0.131*  0.260*** 
  (0.070)  (0.069) 
Treatment*Exam 1  -0.110  -0.248*** 
  (0.074)  (0.075) 
Treatment*Exam 2  -0.154  -0.362*** 
  (0.095)  (0.091) 
Treatment*Exam 3  -0.131*  -0.236*** 
  (0.078)  (0.077) 
Treatment*Exam 4  -0.090  -0.256** 
  (0.078)  (0.099) 
Treatment*Exam 5  -0.161**  -0.258*** 
  (0.082)  (0.092) 
Treatment*Exam 6  -0.136*  -0.367*** 
  (0.076)  (0.088) 
Treatment*Exam 7  -0.117  -0.239*** 
  (0.080)  (0.080) 
Exam 1  0.433***  -0.147*** 
  (0.051)  (0.046) 
Exam 2  -0.082  0.507*** 
  (0.067)  (0.061) 
Exam 3  0.443***  -0.053 
  (0.057)  (0.046) 
Exam 4  0.412***  0.493*** 
  (0.058)  (0.072) 
Exam 5  0.247***  0.627*** 
  (0.061)  (0.060) 
Exam 6  -0.155***  0.427*** 
  (0.056)  (0.069) 
Exam 7  -0.227***  0.133** 
  (0.056)  (0.055) 
     
Implied Treatment Exam 1  0.021  0.012 
  (0.040)  (0.031) 
Implied Treatment Exam 2  -0.023  -0.101 
  (0.070)  (0.078) 
Implied Treatment Exam 3  0.000  0.024 
  (0.041)  (0.052) 
Implied Treatment Exam 4  0.041  0.004 
  (0.041)  (0.074) 
Implied Treatment Exam 5  -0.030  0.002 
  (0.063)  (0.064) 
Implied Treatment Exam 6  -0.005  -0.107 
  (0.065)  (0.078) 
Implied Treatment Exam 7  0.014  0.022 
  (0.061)  (0.074) 
Observations  1544  1208 
R-squared  0.344  0.326 
Notes: The dependent variable is the dummy Pass. Standard errors (reported in parentheses) are corrected for 
heteroskedasticity and clustered at the student level. In all the regressions we control for Female, High School 
Grade, Type of High School attended, Late enrollment, Residence near the university. The symbols ***, **, * 
indicate that coefficients are statistically significant, respectively, at the 1, 5, and 10 percent level. 
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7. Concluding Remarks 
Policymakers and researches often debate about students’ performance and on policies that may help 
at boosting them. The improvement of students’ performance is important both when considering 
primary  and  secondary  education  and  when looking  at  tertiary  education since  skills acquired  by 
undergraduate students are crucial for their success in the labor market. In addition, since in many 
countries,  and  particularly  in  Italy,  tertiary  education  is  characterized  by  high  drop  out  rates  and 
excessive duration of the academic career, the improvement of students performance may translate in 
a reduction of the number of students dropping out from university studies. 
  A widely investigated strategy to improve student performance is that based on educational 
resources, but a considerable impact may derive also from changes in the organization of teaching 
activities and in evaluation practices. Recently, a number of papers have shown that providing students 
with feedback information both on their interim performance that on the performance of their peers 
helps at increasing student results (Azmat and Iriberri, 2010, Bandiera et al. 2009). In this vein, the 
aim of our paper has been to investigate the effect of more frequent examinations allowing students to 
obtain a number of beneficial effects, deriving both from the provision of feedback and from the 
division of the class workload and the commitment allowed by recurrent deadlines.  
  To  analyze  these  effects  we  have  carried  out  a  randomized  experiment  involving 
undergraduate students enrolled at an Italian University and attending two introductory economics 
classes. Students included in the treated group were allowed to undertake an intermediate exam and 
were  informed  about  the  results  obtained,  while  students  in  the  control  group  were  allowed  to 
undertake exclusively the final examination at  the end of the classes (as established by the University 
rules).  
From our analysis it emerges that students undertaking the intermediate examination obtain a 
better performance both in terms of probability of passing the exam and of grades obtained. Treated 
students have a probability of 20 percentage points higher of passing the exam and their grades are 4-5 
points higher. These positive effects are mainly concentrated among students endowed with higher 
abilities. The better performance obtained by treated students at the targeted examination seems not to 
be driven by substitution effects. 
The design of our experiment allowed us to disentangle the effect deriving from more frequent 
examinations in a “feedback provision” effect and a “workload division or commitment” effect. Our 
estimates show that the positive impact of the intermediate examination is entirely due to the workload 
division or commitment effect, while it turns out that the feedback provision has no positive effect on 
performance.  
According to our results the recent law that in Italy has reorganized classes in longer modules 
defining a maximum number of examinations may lead to an increase in the duration of students 
academic career.    21 
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